District Assemblies Common Fund Act 455 Of 1993 Pdf Free [WORK]

District Assemblies Common Fund Act 455 Of 1993 Pdf Free ::: https://urlin.us/2t3ksT

Consequently, the inclusion of the DACF in the Schedule to Act 947 is in contravention of the constitution and the same is unconstitutional, void and of no effect. We, must emphasise however, that this finding does not make the rest of the Act void. We have taken due note of the desire of the Government to free itself from the constraints imposed on it by the statutory earmarking of revenue which leaves very little revenue for general development of the nation. The Government may realign statutory earmarked funds, but, certainly, it may not do so to the constitutional funds without amending the relevant provisions of the Constitution in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution.

Healthcare delivery in general is an information-intensive undertaking and is particularly so in mental healthcare. Decentralisation of mental health services to the district and emphasis on community-based mental healthcare delivery means more demands will be made on the existing information system which is mostly paper-based. The fact that the Mental Health Act prescribes certain mandatory sequence of activities such as Mental Health Review Tribunals taking place during a maximum set period after a patient is admitted under the Act, means the existing Mental Health Information System (MHIS), no matter how flawed, has to support such imposed legal requirements under the Act. There will be serious implications, for example, to tell the lawyer of a detained patient, whose case is waiting to be heard by the tribunal that his/her psychiatric case notes could not be found. But under the current system, lost case notes are so common that they tend to be accepted as normal. Therefore, implementation of the Act requires a major overhaul or complete re-design of the current MHIS to support efficient mental healthcare delivery under the new stricter regime of the Act.

Respondent, the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio, applied for a building permit to enlarge a church in Boerne, Texas. When local zoning authorities denied the permit, relying on an ordinance governing historic preservation in a district which, they argued, included the church, the Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial under, inter alia, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal, and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional.

Mitchell, supra, at 128 (opinion of Black, J.). In assessing the breadth of § 5's enforcement power, we begin with its text. Congress has been given the power "to enforce" the "provisions of this article." We agree with respondent, of course, that Congress can enact legislation under § 5 enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. The "provisions of this article," to which § 5 refers, include the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress' power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause follows from our holding in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), that the "fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment." See also United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 789 (1966) (there is "no doubt of the power of Congress to enforce by appropriate criminal sanction every right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Respondent contends that RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress' remedial or preventive power. The Act, it is said, is a reasonable means of protecting the free exercise of religion as defined by Smith. It prevents and remedies laws which are enacted with the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practices. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 533 (1993) ("[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible"). To avoid the difficulty of proving such violations, it is said, Congress can simply invalidate any law which imposes a substantial burden on a religious practice unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of accomplishing that interest. If Congress can prohibit laws with discriminatory effects in order to prevent racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 477 (1980) (plurality opinion); City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 177, then it can do the same, respondent argues, to promote religious liberty.

I shall not restate what has been said in other opinions, which have demonstrated that Smith is gravely at odds with our earlier free exercise precedents. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 570-571 (1993) (SOUTER, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that it is "difficult to escape the conclusion that, whatever Smith's virtues, they do not include a comfortable fit with settled law"); Smith, 494 U. S., at 894-901 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); see also McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1120-1127 (1990). Rather, I examine here the early American tradition of religious free exercise to gain insight into the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause-an inquiry the Court in Smith did not undertake. We have previously recognized the importance of interpreting the Religion Clauses in light of their history. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 673 (1984) ("The Court's

Again, this practice of excusing religious pacifists from military service demonstrates that, long before the First Amendment was ratified, legislative accommodations were a common response to conflicts between religious practice and civil obligation. Notably, the Continental Congress exempted objectors from conscription to avoid "violence to their consciences," explicitly recognizing that civil laws must sometimes give way to freedom of conscience. Origins of Free Exercise 1468.

To decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress sufficient power to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, the Court measures the legislation against the free-exercise standard of Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990). For the reasons stated in my opinion in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 564-577 (1993) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), I have serious doubts about the precedential value of the Smith rule and its entitlement to adherence. These doubts are intensified today by the historical arguments going to the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause presented in JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S dissent, ante, at 548-564, which raises very substantial issues about the soundness of the Smith rule. See also ante, p. 537 (JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part) (addressing historical arguments). But without briefing and argument on the merits of that rule (which this Court has never had in any case, including Smith itself, see Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 571-572), I am not now prepared to join JUSTICE O'CONNOR in rejecting it or the majority in assuming it to be correct. In order to provide full adversarial consideration, this case should be set down for reargument permitting plenary reexamination of the issue. Since the Court declines to follow that course, our free-exercise 2b1af7f3a8

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